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ONE FORM OF SUCCESSIVE APPROXIMATION METHOD AND
CHOICE PROBLEM
V.K.BULITKO
1. Introduction
A mathematical model of Subject behaviour choice is proposed. The background
of the model is the concept of two preference relations determining Subject be-
haviour. These are an ”internal” or subjective preference relation and an ”external”
or objective preference relation.
The first (internal) preference relation is defined by some partial order on a set
of states of the Subject. The second (external) preference relation on the state set
is defined by a mapping from the state set to another partially ordered set. The
mapping will be called evaluation mapping (function).
We research the process of external preference maximization in a fashion that uses
the external preference as little as possible. On the contrary, Subject may use the
internal preference without any restriction.
The complexity of a maximization procedure depends on the disagreement be-
tween these preferences. To solve the problem we apply some kind of the successive
approximations methods. In terms of evaluation mappings this method operates on
a decomposition of the mapping into a superposition of several standard operations
and ”easy” mappings (see the details below). Obtained in such way superpositions
are called approximating forms.
We construct several such forms and present two applications. One of them is
concerned with a hypothetic origin of logic. The other application provides a new
interpretation of the well known model of human choice by Lefebvre [4, 5]. The
interpretation seems to suggest a justification different from the one proposed by
Lefebvre himself.
2. Scheme of Behaviour Choice Based on Two Preferences
We consider a Subject faced with a choice among a set of states in the environ-
ment. Some of them may be better than others and some states are incomparable.
Subject’s goal is to reach a satisfactory state (generally, a set of states).
One fundamental feature of many real-world behaviour problems is the difference
between the evaluations of a state before and after the state is arrived at. We try to
describe this by introducing two preference relations on the state set. One relation
describes ”internal” system of values based on the Subject’s internal representation
(or model) of the world. The other, ”external” relation, is based on consequences of
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chosen states and reflects the actual nature of the interaction between the environ-
ment and the Subject.
Unlike the objective external relation, the internal preference relation is intrinsic
to the Subject’s mentality for the Subject perceives the world in terms of it. Con-
tradictions between the internal and external preference relations create problems
for the Subject. Besides, in general, there is a cost associated with obtaining infor-
mation on the true external preference relation. Here we refer not only to the cost
of accessing the information but also the cost of changing of Subject’s behaviour
patterns. (However, we abstract from the issue of what the costs may actually be).
Thus, informally the problem is to find a maximum in the external preference
under given restrictions on access to the information about the external preference.
However, there are no restrictions on the internal preference usage. Therefore, the
Subject has to seek a maximum using the internal preference as much as possible.
Naturally, to get any value of using the internal preference, the Subject somehow
needs to approximate the external (”leading”) preference with its internal one.
It seems to us that such interpretation of the choice problem corresponds to a
certain conservatism on the side of the Subject when it is necessary to follow some
external pressure. Indeed, even if the Subject is aware of its incomplete and/or
incorrect representation it often might not be able to correct it instantaneously.
Therefore, it will need to refine/reconstruct its representation starting with what is
available.
Thus, we turn to the successive approximation principle that will guide our further
investigations. The underlying idea is as follows. The Subject needs to follow some
part of its internal preference for as long as possible. Then, on the basis of accessible
information on the external preference the Subject finds the next part of the internal
preference and uses it to proceed further. The process then repeats. So the Subject
needs a scheme to select current parts of its intrinsic (internal) preference. The
following section is devoted to a theory of such schemes.
3. An explication of successive approximation method
Let S be a set of Subject states, (M,≤m), (L,≤l) be partially ordered sets of
internal and external estimates correspondingly. Let ϕ : S → M,ψ : S → L be
mappings that define internal and external preference relations correspondingly.
It is possible to simplify this description by introducing an order ≤S on S through
the mapping ϕ and the poset (M,≤m) as follows. Let us set s ≤S s
′ ⇐⇒ ϕ(s) <m
ϕ(s′)∨s = s′. Thus, we move from an initial description to the description 〈(M,≤m
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), (L,≤l), ψ : M → L〉 that we will use from now on. Then (M,≤M) plays the role
of (S,≤S) above and ψ = is called the evaluation mapping (function).
It is worth noting that generally in each of the choice problems the Subject gets
corresponding internal and external preferences and evaluation mappings. These
three objects can depend functionally on some parameters of the choice problem.
First, we consider the case of a single problem of choice. Later on, in the section
related to Lefebvre’s model, we will generalize to a family of choice problems.
If the evaluation function ψ appears to be a monotonic mapping (i.e., the condition
(∀m1, m2 ∈ M)[m1 ≤m m2 =⇒ ψ(m1) ≤l ψ(m2)] is met), then both preference
relations (M,≤m) and (L,≤l) are compatible (coordinated) and de facto the Subject
may follow its internal preference to reach the target state (that is, a state with the
maximum value).
Otherwise, it is natural to represent ψ as a superposition of monotonic evaluation
mappings from (M,≤m) to (L,≤l) and several connecting operations (connectives).
We seek to obtain representations that can be used as instructions for successive
approximations. In finding a representation of this kind such that uses as few
monotonic evaluation mappings as possible (apart from the connectives), we will
use the external preference relation as little as possible.
So our next goal is to propose some collections of connectives such that it will
be possible to prove the existence of a corresponding representation with required
features (we call it approximating form henceforth). Then, we will demonstrate
their utility for certain applications.
3.1. Approximating forms. The suggested version of the principle deals with
some special but yet fairly general representation of the evaluation function ψ (op-
erator ψ) in the so-called ”approximating form”. It uses three axiomatically defined
operations ⊟,⊞,⊚ based only on general properties of the posets (M,≤m), (L,≤l)
as follows.
For every poset (R,≤r) the standard mappings (·)
△, (·)▽ : R→ 2R are defined by
t△ = {t′ ∈ R|t′ ≤r t}, t▽ = {t′ ∈ R|t ≤r t′}.
Let us suppose a binary operation ⊟ : L×L→ L and unary operations ⊞ : 2L →
L,⊚ : L→ L are defined in such a way that the following system A of axioms holds.
A1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≤m s] & (∀s˘, s˘
′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<m s˘′]]].
A2: (∀L
′, L′′ ⊆ L)(∀x ∈ L′)[(x ≤l ⊞(L′))&(L′ ⊆ L′′ =⇒ ⊞(L′) ≤l ⊞(L′′))].
A3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟(l,⊚(l)) = l & (l ≤l l′ =⇒ ⊚(l) ≤l ⊚(l′))].
A4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≤l l′ =⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟(l′, l′′) = l & ⊚ (l′) ≤l l′′]].
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For every operator ν : M → L we call set n(ν) = {(m,m′)|(m ≤m m′) & (ν(m) 6≤l
ν(m′))} non-monotonicity domain of ν. If n(ν) = ∅ then ν is called monotonic
operator.
Theorem 1. Let all axioms of the system A be satisfied for (M,≤m), (L,≤l)
and lengths of all increasing chains in (M,≤m) not exceed some integer D. Then for
every ψ : M → L there exists a representation ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . ))) that
all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . are monotonic mappings from (M,≤m) to (L,≤l).
Furthermore, the number of occurrences of the operation ⊟ in this representation
does not exceed D.
Proof. Let us reduce the problem for a given operator ψ to the same problem for
a simpler operator ψ1 such that the following holds ψ = ⊟(ϕ1, ψ1) and n(ψ1) $ n(ψ).
First, we define M1 = {x ∈ M |n(ψ) ∩ (x
△ × x△) 6= ∅}, M1 =M1
ϕ1(x) =


⊞(ψ(x△)), x ∈M1,
ψ(x), x ∈M1.
Then we set ψ1(x) to any such z ∈ L that ⊟(ϕ1(x), z) = ψ(x) & ⊚ (ϕ1(x)) ≤l z if
ϕ1(x) 6= ψ(x). Otherwise, we set ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)).
Existence of the element z in the definition is guaranteed by axioms A3,A4. Now,
the equality ψ(x) = ⊟(ϕ1(x), ψ1(x)) holds because of the definitions of ϕ1, ψ1.
Let us prove that operator ϕ1 : (M ≤m)→ (L,≤l) is a monotonic one.
First, ϕ1 = ψ on M
1 and we may use the condition x, y ∈ M1&x ≤m y =⇒
ψ(x) ≤l ψ(y). Indeed, otherwise ψ(x) 6≤l ψ(y), x ≤m y, ψ(x) 6= ψ(y) and, therefore,
y ∈M1 ∩M
1. However, M1 ∩M1 = ∅ which leads to a contradiction.
Second, ϕ1 maps (M1,≤m) into (L,≤l) monotonically in accordance with A2.
Finally, let us consider the ”mixed” case when x ∈ M1, y ∈ M1 and all elements
of M are comparable with respect to ≤m. It is clear that y ≤m x is impossible since
condition z ∈M1 =⇒ z
▽ ⊆M1 immediately follows from the definition of M1.
Thus, it remains to consider the possibility of x ≤m y. In such a case ϕ1(y) =
⊞(ψ(y△)) ≥l ψ(x) in accordance to A2. On the other hand, ψ(x) = ϕ1(x) on M
1
follows from the definition of ϕ1. Hence, operator ϕ1 is monotonic.
We are now ready to prove the last assertion of the theorem. For that it is sufficient
to demonstrate the inclusion M1∪M˘1 ⊆M
2. Here M2,M2 are defined for ψ1 in the
same way as M1,M1 were defined for ψ above. M˘1 is the set of all minimal elements
of set M1, see A1. Namely: M
2 = M2 and M2 = {x ∈M |n(ψ1) ∩ (x
△ × x△) 6= ∅}.
We now have M2 ⊆ (M1 \ M˘1) and n(ψ1) ⊆ n(ψ) \ M˘1 ×M1. So the sequence
M1 % M2 % M3 % . . . ends at a step with the number that can not be greater
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than the highest of lengths of the increasing chains in poset (M,≤m). Indeed, since
M˘2 ⊆ M1 \ M˘1 then in accordance with A1 for every element y ∈ M˘2 there exists
some x ∈ M˘1 such that x <l y. Therefore, one can choose an increasing chain of
representatives of sets M˘1, M˘2, M˘3, . . . which are mutually disjoint sets.
We will now prove that M1 ∪ M˘1 ⊆ M
2. First, ϕ1(x) = ψ(x) holds for every
x ∈ M1. From here ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)). However, mapping ψ1 is monotonic on M
1
in view of A3 and since ψ is monotonic on M
1. So (M1 ×M1) ∩ n(ψ1) = ∅ and
therefore M1 ⊆M2.
Further, let x, y ∈M1 ∪ M˘1 and x ≤m y. Then we can show that ψ1(x) ≤l ψ1(y).
Indeed, the case x, y ∈ M1 was considered above. The case x, y ∈ M˘1 is impossible
since all elements of M˘1 are incomparable by the definition. Above, we saw that
x ∈ M1 & x ≤m y =⇒ y ∈ M1. Besides M
1 ∩M1 = ∅. Therefore, x ∈M
1, y ∈ M˘1
is the only case remaining to consider. By definition ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)) and relation
⊟(ϕ1(y), ψ1(y)) = ψ(y) holds. Moreover, ψ(y) <l ϕ(y). In accordance with A4 we
have ⊚(ϕ1(y)) ≤y ψ1(y). Hence, ψ1(x) ≤l ψ1(y) takes place since ⊚ is a monotonic
operation in view of A3 and ψ(z) ≤l ϕ1(z), z ∈ M in accordance to A2 and the
construction. 
Let us denote by M the class of all monotonic mappings from (M,≤M ) to (L,
≤L). Also let S(ϕ) = {x|ϕ(x) >L ⊚(x)}, ϕ ∈M.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of theorem 1 for every ψ : M → L there exists
a substitution p : {z1, . . . , zD+1} → M such that S(p(zn)) ⊆ S(p(zn+1)), n = 1, D,
and ψ = Sb
z1 ... zD+1
p(z1)...p(zD+1)
⊟ (z1,⊟(z2,⊟(· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . ))).
Proof. Let us fix a formula Φ(z1, . . . , zD+1) = ⊟(z1,⊟(z2, (· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . )))
and consider substitutions of monotonic functions instead of variables z1, . . . , zD+1
when their results are determined.
According to theorem 1 for every ψ : M → L there exists representation ψ =
⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . ))) where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . are monotonic mappings from
(M,≤M) into (L,≤L). The number of occurrences of operation ⊟ in this represen-
tation does not exceed D.
Now, if for a given mapping ψ we obtain representation ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3,
· · · ⊟ (ϕk, ϕk+1)))) with k < D, then one can always continue the expression on
the right side of the representation till ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . )ϕD+1)). For that it is
sufficient to set
ϕi(x) = ⊚(ϕi−1(x)), i = k + 2, D + 1.
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In accordance with axiom A3 the obtained functions are monotonic and
ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, · · ·⊟ (ϕD, ϕD+1))))

For the application below we will need some special monotonic functions in ap-
proximating forms. To define the functions we come up with the following auxiliary
construction. Based on axiom A1 let us split set M :
M1 = M
⊥;
Mn+1 = (M \ ∪
j≤n
Mj)
⊥.
Here Mj consists of the elements that are incomparable in (M,≤M) for any j.
We denote by θ-function of rank i any monotonic mapping θ : M → L such that
θ(x) = ⊚(x) for all x ∈ ∪
j<i
Mj as well as θ(x) ∈ max(L,≤L) for all x ∈ ∪
j>i
Mj . The
rank of a given function θ is denoted as ρ(θ). Let Θ be the class of all θ-functions.
Corollary 2. Let conditions of theorem 1 be fulfilled, D be the exact upper
bound of lengths of increasing chains in (M,≤M) and (L,≤L) contain the greatest
element γ. Then for any mapping ψ : M → L there exists a substitution p :
{z1, . . . , zD+1} → Θ
µ, such that ρ(p(zi)) = i, i = 1, D + 1 and ψ = Sb
z1 ... zD+1
p(z1)...p(zD+1)
⊟
(z1,⊟(z2,⊟(· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . ))).
Proof. We use induction on D. In the case of D = 0 the statement is obvious
since there are no restrictions for θ-functions. Therefore, ψ ∈ Θ.
Induction step: Let us define θ1 of rank 1 in the following manner:
θ1(x) =


ψ(x), if x ∈M1,
γ, else.
Then we may write ψ = ⊟(θ1, ψ1) where for ψ1 we have ψ1(x) = ⊚(x) if x ∈ M1
else ψ1(x) satisfies ⊟(γ(x), ψ1(x)) = ψ(x).
It remains to obtain the desirable representation of ψ1 on the set M \M1 with
the partial order induced by ≤M . Since the length of the longest increasing chain
in (M \M1,≤M) is D − 1 we may use the induction supposition. 
Remark. Length of the representation obtained in theorem 1 can be essentially
lower than lengths of the representations suggested by the corollaries. From our
initial standpoint the lower the length is the better. However, sometimes we will
need special forms of approximating functions.
Let us suppose a binary operation ⊟,⊎ : L × L → L and unary operations
⊚ : L → L are defined in such a way that the system B1 − B4 of axioms takes
place. Here Bi coincides with Ai for i = 1, 3, 4. Also
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B2: (∀x, y ∈ L)[x, y ≤l ⊎(x, y)].
Theorem 2. Let all axioms of the system B be satisfied for (M,≤m), (L,≤l
) and (M,≤m) and lengths of all increasing chains in (M,≤m) do not exceed
some integer D. Then for every ψ : M → L there exists a representation ψ =
⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . ))) where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . are monotonic mappings from
(M,≤m) to (L,≤l).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟ in this representation does not
exceed D.
Proof. Firstly, in the case when (∀x ∈ M)[|x△| < ∞ is true we can prove this
theorem using theorem 1. For that we will only need to note that in this case it
is possible to replace ⊞(ψ(x△) with any expression of the kind ⊎(psi(z1),⊎(· · · ⊎
(ψ(zn1, ψ(zn) . . . )). Here z1, . . . , zn is an enumeration of the finite set x
△. Indeed, in
the proof of theorem 1 we used axiom A2 only for subsets of L of the form ψ(x
△).
Thus, it is sufficient to check that axiom A2 is met for sets of the kind ψ(x
△). This
check is trivial on the basis of axiom B2 for operation ⊎.
Otherwise, when there are infinite sets x△ we can make use of the same scheme
for the connective ⊞ based on the condition of increasing chain finiteness in (M,≤m
). For that let us enumerate elements z1, z2, . . . , zn, . . . of set x
△ for a given x ∈
M . In parallel we will enumerate expressions ⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)), ⊎(⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)),
ψ(z2)), . . . ,⊎(⊎(· · · ⊎ (⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)), ψ(z2)) . . . ), zn), . . .
By axiom B2 the values of these expressions do not decrease in (L,≤L). In view of
the finiteness supposition for increasing chains in (L,≤L) the sequence of computed
values becomes stable from some place. We set ϕ1(x) to this final value.
Thus, ϕ1 is monotonic mapping and ψ(x) ≤L ϕ1(x), x ∈ M . The last part of the
proof is analogous to the corresponding part of theorem 1. 
In place of or together with A the dual axiom system A⋆ can be fulfilled. This
can be shown by replacing ≤ with ≥ and ⊞,⊟,⊚ with ⊞⋆,⊟⋆,⊚⋆ correspondingly:
A⋆1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≥m s] & (∀s˘, s˘
′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<m s˘′]]].
A⋆2: (∀L
′, L′′ ⊆ L)(∀x ∈ L′)[(x ≥l ⊞⋆(L′))&(L′ ⊆ L′′ =⇒ ⊞⋆(L′) ≥l
⊞⋆(L′′))].
A⋆3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(⊚⋆(l), l) = l & (l ≥l l′ =⇒ ⊚⋆(l) ≥l ⊚⋆(l′))].
A⋆4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≥l l′ =⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(l′′, l′) = l & ⊚⋆ (l′) ≥l l′′]].
Then the dual theorem holds:
Theorem 1⋆. Let all axioms of the system A⋆ be fulfilled for posets (M,≤m
), (L,≤l), operators ⊞
⋆,⊟⋆,⊚⋆; and the lengths of all increasing chains in (M,≤m)
do not exceed some integerD. Then for every operator ψ : M → L there exists repre-
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sentation ψ = ⊟⋆(· · ·⊟⋆ (⊟⋆(ϕn+1, ϕn), ϕn−1) . . . , ϕ1) where all ϕi, i = 1, . . . , n, n+1,
are monotonic mappings from (M,≤m) to (L,≤l).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟ in this representation does not
exceed D.
The dual theorem is related to the dual axiom system B⋆.
B⋆1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≥m s] & (∀s˘, s˘
′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<m s˘′]]].
B⋆2: (∀x, y ∈ L)[x, y ≥l ⊎
⋆(x, y)].
B⋆3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(⊚⋆(l), l) = l & (l ≥l l′ =⇒ ⊚⋆(l) ≥l ⊚⋆(l′))].
B⋆4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≥l l′ =⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(l′′, l′) = l & ⊚⋆ (l′) ≥l l′′]].
Then the dual theorem holds:
Theorem 2⋆. Let all axioms of the system A⋆ be fulfilled for posets (M,≤m
), (L,≤l), operators ⊎
⋆,⊟⋆,⊚⋆ and the lengths of all increasing chains in (M,≤m)
do not exceed some integerD. Then for every operator ψ : M → L there exists repre-
sentation ψ = ⊟⋆(· · ·⊟⋆ (⊟⋆(ϕn+1, ϕn), ϕn−1) . . . , ϕ1) where all ϕi, i = 1, . . . , n, n+1,
are monotonic mappings from (M,≤m) to (L,≤l).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟ in this representation does not
exceed D.
Below we refer to all these representations as approximating forms.
4. Possible Origin of Logic
It is easy to arrive at the classical two-valued propositional logic now. For that it
is sufficient to choose ({0, 1}, 0 ≤ 1) as (L,≤l) and the standard poset (B
n,4) on
boolean cube Bn as poset (M,≤m). It is well known that every finite poset can be
isotonically included into (Bn,4) for the appropriate n.
It is also well known that poset (Bn,4) is a self-dual poset for any n. Therefore,
both above introduced representations take place in this case.
Lemma. 1) The system of posets (Bn,4), (B,≤) as (M,≤m), (L ≤l) correspond-
ingly and operation → as ⊟⋆, operation 1 : Bn → {1} as ⊚⋆, and operation &
~β4~α
~α as
⊞⋆(β▽) fulfill the axiom set A⋆.
2) The system of posets (Bn,4), (B,≤) as (M,≤m), (L ≤l) correspondingly and op-
eration → as ⊟⋆, operation 1 : Bn → {1} as ⊚⋆, and operation & as ⊎⋆ obeys the
axiom set B+⋆.
Proof. This can be shown via a routine check of the axioms.
The direct corollary of this lemma and theorems above is the following
ONE FORM 9
Theorem 3. In the special case of finite ”internal” orders (M,≤m) and linear
”external” orders (L,≤l), |L| = 2, approximating forms from each of theorems 1
and 2 and their dual ones generate all formulae of the classical propositional logic
(within logical equivalence).
As a result, this interesting statement follows.
Corollary 3. Every n-argument logical (boolean) function f can be represented
by the implicative normal form f = Pk → Pk−1 → · · · → P1, where k ≤ n, and
Pi, i = 1, k, are monotonic boolean function.
It is remarkable that just the dual approximating forms present the usual propo-
sitional implication. One may then wonder why the operation →⋆ is not present in
natural languages? In our opinion, the main reason is that the dual approximating
forms of theorems 1⋆, 2⋆ begin with a given operator ψ and approximate it by means
of successive simplifications: ψ1 = ⊟
⋆(ψ, ϕ1), ψ2 = ⊟
⋆(ψ1, ϕ2), . . . while ψi is not a
monotonic operator (i.e., not an ”easy” one). Thus, the approximation begins with
a target unlike in the case of the approximating forms in theorems 1,2.
Now one can consider the classical two-valued propositional logic merely as a
realization of the above-mentioned principle of successive approximations for the
problem of decision-making within Subject-environment survival framework.
Thus, from this viewpoint, the classical propositional logic can take its beginning
from the survival problem. It is also important that this hypothetical origin of logic
appears quite natural.
5. What stands behind Lefebvre’s model
Lefebvre suggested a model of Subject facing a choice of an alternative out of
a set. In his model the Subject is represented by the function X1 = f(x1, x2, x3)
where X1, x1, x2, x3 run over the [0, 1] segment. As [4, 5] presents it: the value of
X1 is interpreted as the readiness to choose a positive pole with probability X1, and
the value of x3 - as the Subject’s plan or intention to choose a positive pole with
probability x3. Variables x1 and x2 represent the world influence on the subject.
This function f is required to obey the following axioms introduced by Lefebvre:
L1: (∀x3 ∈ [0, 1])(f(0, 0, x3) = x3) - ”the axiom of free choice”;
L2: (∀x3 ∈ [0, 1])(f(0, 1, x3) = 0) - ”the axiom of credulity”;
L3: (∀x2, x3 ∈ [0, 1])(f(1, x2, x3) = 1) - ”the axiom of non-evil-inclinations”;
L4: (∀i, j, k)[{i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}) =⇒ (∀xj , xk ∈ [0, 1])(∃c, c
′ ∈ R)(∀xi ∈
[0, 1])[f(x1, x2, x3) = cxi + c
′]] - ”the postulate of simplicity”.
10 V.K.BULITKO
By means of the model Lefebvre gave explanations of several psychological ex-
periments thusly putting his model under the spotlight (e.g., see bibliography in
[5]).
The following question is still open: Is the model only a compact representation
(i.e., a ”roll-up”) of certain experimental data or it describes some fundamental
structure governing human behavior?
In order to substantiate his model, Lefebvre used, in particular, known ”anthropic
principle” [5]. In our opinion, the justification presented by Lefebvre while being
appealing does not appear entirely sound and bullet-proof. The specific comments
are presented in [6]. In the following we suggest an alternative justification for
the model. Namely, we develop the approach mentioned in [6] using the above
constructed theory of approximating forms.
First, we show how it is possible to eliminate ”the postulate of simplicity” intro-
ducing the notion of a pure L-ensemble. The last concept reduces the general case
to the boolean case. This step leads to the boolean order for the external prefer-
ence relation (L,≤l), L = {0, 1}. Second, we will show that the system of the first
three axioms by Lefebvre can be replaced with a postulate of special poset (M,≤m).
Namely, this poset can be chosen in the form of a linear ordered three-element set.
We suggest a natural interpretation of this form of poset (L,≤l). Then Lefebvre’s
function f follows from one of our approximating forms.
5.1. Lefebvre’s ensembles. It is easy to check that in the boolean case X1, x1, x2,
x3 ∈ {0, 1} the axioms L1−L3 completely define f . Namely, in this case f(x1, x2, x3) =
(x3 → x2) → x1. (The ”postulate of simplicity” L4 sets f on the interior of the
three-dimensional cube [0, 1]3 in the real-valued case. A methodological criticism of
the postulate is expounded in [6]).
Let us consider a setQ of Subjects si with each being described by the probabilistic
collection α˜i of values of the boolean variables (n1, n2, n3). Let us assume that the
probability of encountering a Subject with a collection α˜ of the variable values in Q
is equal to pα˜.
If behavior zi each si ∈ Q is described with the function n3 → n2 → n1 then
we refer to Q as the Lefebvre’s ensemble (L-ensemble or simply ensemble) 〈Q,P 〉
with characteristic P = (p0, . . . , p7). Besides, we call elements of the L-ensemble
L-Subjects. (Here pk denotes pα˜ and k is the decimal representation of the binary
sequence α˜).
Ensemble 〈Q,P 〉 averaging Boolean variables n1, n2, n3, zi yields real numbers
x1, x2, x3, z ∈ [0, 1]. Given the truth table of the Boolean function n3 → n2 → n1
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elementary probabilistic considerations lead to the following equalities:
1 =
7
Σ
k=0
pk,(1)
x1 = p4 + p5 + p6 + p7,(2)
x2 = p2 + p3 + p6 + p7,(3)
x3 = p1 + p3 + p5 + p7,(4)
z = p1 + p4 + p5 + p6 + p7.(5)
It is therefore reasonable to ask for which L-ensembles 〈Q,P 〉 values of x1, x2, x3, z
satisfy Lefebvre’s equation z = x1 + (1− x1 − x2 + x2x3)x3.
The following examples show that, generally speaking, z 6= f(x1, x2, x3). Indeed,
let us set p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = p5 = p6 = p7 = 0, 1. Then x1 = x2 = x3 = 0.4
and f(x1, x2, x3) = 0.544. However, the ensemble average z equals 0.5. Interestingly
enough, the difference can be quite substantial as the following example demon-
strates. Namely, p0 = p1 = p2 = p4 = p6 = p7 = 0, p3 = p5 = 0.5 correspond to
x1 = x2 = 0.5, x3 = 1. Then z = 0.5 but f(0.5, 0.5, 1) = 0.75. Thus, the error is at
least 30%.
On the other hand, the equality z = f(x1, x2, x3) is met for all possible (i.e.,
obeying equations (1)-(4)) characteristics P when (x1, x2, x3) ∈ {(x1, x2, x3)|x1 =
1} ∪ {(x1, x2, x3)|x2 = 0} ∪ {(x1, x2, x3)|x2 = 1} ∪ {(x1, x2, x3)|x3 = 0}.
Theorem 4. For every collection x1, x2, x3 ∈ [0, 1] there exists L-ensemble
〈Q,P (x1, x2, x3)〉 with characteristic P (x1, x2, x3) such that z = f(x1, x2, x3).
Proof. Let us consider three independent Boolean random variable ζ, η, θ :
N → {0, 1} with the mean values x1, x2, x3 correspondingly. Then random vari-
able (ζ, η, θ) : N→ {0, 1}3 runs over the desired ensemble 〈Q,P (x1, x2, x3)〉. For the
i-th component of the characteristic pi(x1, x2, x3) = Π
j=1,2,3
(1−σj+(−1)
1−σjxj) is true
where i = Σ
j=1,2,3
2σj . The verification by substitution shows that the interrelations
(1)-(4) are fulfilled and if z satisfies (5), then z = f(x1, x2, x3). 
We call the ensembles described in this theorem pure Lefebvre’s ensembles (PL-
ensembles). Thus, a PL-ensemble is a collection of L-Subjects with random pa-
rameters (n1, n2, n3) distributed independently in such a way that the probability
P{ni = 1} equals the given number xi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3.
The descriptions of behaviour constructed by means of L-ensembles can be thinner
than the descriptions ”smoothed” by using Lefebvre’s function f for some aspects.
For example, let us consider how ”golden section” for categorization of stimuli with-
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out measurable intensity can be explained in terms of Lefebvre’s theory ([5], p.51)
and in terms of PL-ensembles.
In this case Lefebvre completes his ”Realist condition” x3 = f(x1, x2, x3) with
equations x1 = x2, x1 = 1 − x3. (A justification is given in [5], p.51). In turn, that
yields the equation x33 − 2x3 + 1 = 0 for the choice of x3. One possible solution is
the well known ”golden section” x3 =
√
5−1
2
.
Following the alternative approach suggested in this paper, we construct the de-
sired PL-ensemble by first postulating the Boolean ”Realist condition” n3 → n2 →
n1 = n3. Then considering the truth area R = {000, 001, 010, 101, 111} of the condi-
tion we form the ensemble with the help of Boolean random variables ζ, η, θ in the
following fashion. The variables ζ, η are independent with the mean value 1 − x3,
and the value of the random variable θ depends on the values of ζ, η in accordance
with the table:
ζ η θ
0 0 0,1
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 1
.
It is important that in the first line of the table value 1 is chosen with the probability
of x3. Then if x3 satisfies x
3
3− 2x3+1 = 0 then we obtain the desired PL-ensemble.
Indeed, every element of the ensemble is a ”Realist” and the probability to encounter
an L-Subject with parameters (n1, n2, 1) is determined by solutions to the equation
x33−2x3+1 = 0. Finally, we arrive at the ”golden section” choosing the corresponding
solution exactly as it was done by Lefebvre.
We believe that the L-ensemble tool introduced in this paper opens new oppor-
tunities for Lefebvre’s theory and its applications. Indeed, the ensemble structure
is a new powerful parameter for modeling. It is possible to explain some deviations
of the actual values of variable X1 in real-world experiments by means of the cor-
responding deviations of the real L-ensembles from the PL-ensembles. Thus, the
dynamics of this parameter open a new research avenue.
5.2. Application of approximating forms. We will now show how one can
arrive at Lefebvre’s model on the basis of the theory presented earlier in this paper.
First, we determine appropriate internal and external preferences. Because of the
binary choice in Lefebvre model it is naturally to take ({0, 1},≤) as the external
order. (Here ≤ is the usual order on the set of integers).
ONE FORM 13
Second, according to the interpretation of variables x1, x2, x3 given by Lefebvre,
the values of these variables describe directions of impulses (motivations) pushing
the Subject to the positive or the negative pole. Indeed, x1 corresponds to an impulse
exerted by the external world, x2 corresponds to an impulse exerted by Subject’s
experience, and, finally, x3 corresponds to Subject’s will.
So on one hand, x1, x2, x3 are connected to the motivations. On the other hand,
at any decision node these variables have boolean values. Furthermore, the choice
of some of these values represents the result of the decision node.
In our approach these two sides of variables work simultaneously. We describe the
impulses (”pure motivations”) by partial orders (whereas results of Subject’s choice
are numbers 0 or 1). Two possible values of a variable present two possible pure
motivations for this variable. Our choice of domain of these partial orders is based
on the following reasons.
These six (two specific pure motivations for every variable of {x1, x2, x3}) partial
orders are basic and their interaction would determine Subject’s choices within our
frame of two-preference decision-making. The decision making is done in two stages.
At the first stage some of the given pure motivations (i.e., some variables) are
chosen. At the second stage the Subject proceeds to the pole associated by Lefebvre’s
interpretation with the given value of the variable. This means that Lefebvre’s state
set M∗ has to be {x1, x2, x3}. In our scheme the chosen state has to maximize
external value that is computed with the current evaluation mapping ψ. Hence,
ψ sets the external preference and the latter, in turn, determines Subject’s choices
(decisions).
We now seem to come to the conclusion that it is the interaction of pure moti-
vations that produces these external preferences or equivalently ψ. So the external
preferences have to be some sort of ”mixture” of pure motivations. (Here one can
notice a vague analogy with quantum mechanics.)
Maximizing Subject’s adaptation abilities leads to the best survival chances.
Therefore, one seeks a universal ”mixing” procedure. Corollary 2 tells us that such a
procedure can be attained using the universality of the corresponding approximating
form (in our case D = 2 because two is the upper bound of lengths of the longest
increasing chains possible in posets of three elements):
ψ = Sbz1,z2,z3p(z1),p(z2),p(z3) ⊟ (z1,⊟(z2, z3)).
Here p runs over the class of special functions Θ. Given the chosen external order
we can set ⊟ =9 (see lemma 1 above. 9 is the connective dual for implication).
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Hence it follows that Θ is the set of pure motivations (impulses) in this case. So
|Θ| = 6. Therefore, the sought order on M∗ has to be a linear.
It is natural to deem that this internal linear poset reflects the common division
of the time axis in three periods: ”past”, ”present” and ”future”. Then the current
representation of the world (variable x2 in Levebvre’s model) corresponds to the
point ”present” and the Subject’s intention (x3) corresponds to the point ”future”.
Thus, the remaining variable x1 ought to correspond to the point ”past”. Such
assignment appears natural because the pressure put on the Subject by the environ-
ment is the background of the decision-making problem itself. Thus, we arrive at
the internal preference relation (M∗,≤∗), where M∗ = {x1, x2, x3}, x1 <∗ x2 <∗ x3.
It may seem that x2 <∗ x1 ought to hold since we interpret x2 as the ”past
experience” and x1 as the ”current pressure of the environment”.
However, we should keep in mind that we are currently dealing with the internal
order on states in the process of decision making. In that process ”past experience”
x2 serves a role of Subject’s ”current base” and it is x1 that initiates the decision
making. x3 is merely a means to produce a solution and as such is most likely related
to the future. (Note that such crude models often cover several various factors with
one parameter).
Every decision making act done by the Subject can be characterized by a given
boolean 3-tuple x1,x2,x3 of values of variables x1, x2, x3. On the other hand, as
pointed out above, we associate a pure motivation θxii ∈ Θ with any xi, i = 1, 2, 3
when xi = xi ∈ {0, 1}. Here
θxii (xk) =


1, if i < k,
xi, if i = k,
0, if k < i.
The general external order for 3-tuple x1,x2,x3 is determined by formula
ψx1,x2,x3 = θ
x1
1 9 (θ
x2
2 9 θ
x3
3 ).
Any obtained motivation ψ : M∗ → {0, 1} determines Subject’s decision choice
xi, i = 1, 2, 3, for a given decision making act. In order to find the solution we use
the following local extremization algorithm for ψx1,x2,x3:
1) Starting at the state x1 in order (M∗,≤∗) proceed to the nearest ex-
tremum of θx11 .
2) Then continue from the found state to the nearest extremum of the
inverted function θx22 (due to its place in the approximating form).
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3) Finally, repeat starting from the found state this time using the func-
tion θx33 .
(Note, that the last step of the algorithm uses a double inversion of the motivation
θx33 .)
It is easy to check that the algorithm computes an element of argmaxψx1,x2,x3 ⊆
{x1, x2, x3}. At the second step we turn a chosen xi into xi. This number is Subject’s
choice in the decision making situation defined via x1,x2,x3.
It turns out that for all boolean 3-tuples (x1,x2,x3) the boolean value computed
with the aforementioned scheme coincides with the value computed with the formula
x3 → (x2 → x1). Thus, Lefebvre’s latter formula of behaviour can be derived from
our model of behaviour. In our opinion, Lefebvre’s subjects are distinguished merely
by a particular internal preference: the state order (M∗,≤∗). (The binarity of the
external poset is presumed in Lefebvre’s problem statement.)
Perhaps the approach introduced in this section can, in principle, replace Lefeb-
vre’s axioms. It has no need for such presumptions as ”Anthropic Principle”, ”Prin-
ciple of Freedom”, and ”Simplicity postulate”. In our opinion, such a difference
is advantageous since it appears extremely difficult to find a solid justification for
these presumptions.
Indeed, instead of seeking a body of philosophical support we can apply the theory
of approximating forms. Additionally, the restriction in this section by these orders
does not need any special justification.
In the continuous case the toolbox of L-ensembles not only reduces it to the
Boolean case but also extends the theory’s capacity.
6. Conclusion
As this paper demonstrates, the classical two-valued propositional logic can be
viewed merely as a realization of the principle of successive approximations for the
decision-making problem within the framework of Subject-environment survival.
From this viewpoint, the classical propositional logic can take its beginning from
the survival problem. It is also important that such hypothetical origin of Logics
appears quite natural.
Furthermore, this approach can serve as a background for consideration of other
families of mappings from one poset to another with a chosen notion of simplicity
of mapping. Any such case generates a corresponding logic.
Later in the paper we demonstrated how the effects explained by Lefebvre’s model
can be viewed merely as implications of choosing the binary linear external order
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and the three-element linear internal preference. Such choice reflects on the ordinary
division of the time axis into three parts: the past, the present, and the future.
Taking into account the established connection between logic and approximating
forms one may say that the psychological effects described via Lefebvre’s model can
be interpreted as logic of evaluation operators of the kind ψ : ({1, 2, 3}, {1 < 2, 1 <
3, 2 < 3}) → ({0, 1}, {0 < 1}). This fact can explain prevalence of the effects and
partially of the ”golden section” method.
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